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Motivation
Increasing economic welfare by providing conditions for economic growth while, at the same time, ensuring a level of income equality which is accepted by society are two main goals of governments. In trying to reach these goals, governments face a trade-off. If governments tax income more heavily, everything else held constant they have more scope for redistributing income, which may be desirable to meet fairness concerns. However, the higher the tax rate, the lower the incentives of those with a particularly high ability to work hard. Because government is unable to impose work effort, government actually cannot hold everything else constant. Ultimately, a higher tax rate may mean less money for redistribution. Of course, the effect is even more pronounced in a dynamic perspective because a high tax rate risks stifling growth. The smaller the gross national product, the less future generations may redistribute. In a democracy, redistribution policies reflect redistribution preferences of the electorate, albeit of course indirectly and imperfectly. In this paper, we focus on the development of the desired level of redistribution and thus the political preferences in the electorate, while simultaneously accounting for the fact that redistribution affects effort. 1 We address the following research question: What determines preferences for redistributive policies and effort, and how are these preferences related? In answering this question, we make the following contributions to the literature. First, we use cross-country data from the World Value Survey to analyze the interaction between preferences for effort and for redistribution. We estimate the link between effort and redistribution in a simultaneous equation model, which explicitly takes the links between these two variables into account.
The added advantage of this method is that we can investigate longer-run patterns in the data and that we can control for the macroeconomic environment. We are also able to instrument either preference, and thereby overcome the identification problem resulting from the fact that, in the field, both preferences are determined interactively. Second, we complement the analysis of survey data with a lab experiment where we sequentially (i) induce effort and elicit redistribution decisions, and (ii) induce a redistribution level and elicit effort choices. This takes account of the fact that identification is never perfect with field data. In the field, we cannot directly observe ability, which is a likely determinant of both effort and redistribution preferences. And all we can see is redistribution preferences explaining effort preferences, and effort preferences explaining the desire for redistribution. The lab experiment allows explaining effort choices by the actual level of redistribution and decisions for a level of redistribution by the actual degree of effort.
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We find that preferences are fundamentally inconsistent. Those in favor of more redistribution and those exposed to a regime with more redistribution are less willing to exert effort. Yet the opposite relationship does not hold: In the field, preferences for redistribution are not explained by preferences for effort. In the lab, participants even choose a higher degree of redistribution if they are exogenously forced to exert higher effort. This suggests an alternative explanation for the fact that the degree of redistribution has been growing in many countries (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2011: chapter 7). This may be expected even in the absence of a majority of less able voters who use majority vote to expropriate their compatriots with a higher income. Our data suggest that even a substantial fraction of those who have to pay the bill support more redistribution. Yet we also find that the willingness to exert effort declines as the degree of redistribution increases. The potential inconsistency of preferences faces policy makers with a hard choice: According to our data, a substantial majority supports greater redistribution, but at the same time, all will be worse off due to the negative effect on preferences for effort.
In the following second part, we explain in which ways our paper goes beyond what has already been done. In the third part, we sketch an existing theoretical model which shows the trade-off between effort and redistribution at the individual level. We then investigate the implications of the model in Part Four, based on survey data from the World Value Survey.
Part Five provides experimental evidence on this trade-off, and Part Six concludes.
Earlier Findings
Previous work has used similar survey data to analyze the determinants of preferences for redistribution. (Fong 2001) uses data from a Gallup survey to test whether redistribution preferences result from selfish motives, implying that those who believe in a greater need for help to themselves are also the main supporters. She finds a significant effect of income, as a plausible proxy, but this effect is small. There is an independent, strong effect of beliefs about the role of effort, luck, and opportunity in life outcomes. Social preferences turn out the best explanation for redistribution preferences. Hence, we analyze the feedback between redistribution preferences and effort, and we control for the macroeconomic environment. Our results suggest that modeling effort and redistribution simultaneously is indeed important: Preferences for redistribution affect effort choices, but not vice versa.
A number of experimental papers have tested redistribution preferences. The closest analogue to our approach in the experimental literature is a paper by (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1990) .
They formed groups of five and had one condition where participants decided on a redistribution scheme under the veil of ignorance. In the other condition, it was imposed that average income was maximized, but with a floor constraint. Knowing the redistribution scheme, participants had to engage in a real effort task. The marginal pay rate had considerable returns to scale. When they could choose, almost all groups chose the same scheme as was imposed on the other groups. Productivity was not negatively affected by redistribution, and it actually increased when the scheme was self-selected. In their task, there was considerable room for learning, which could explain these results. Our design differs in that we not only test performance conditional on redistribution, but, in a fully symmetric design, also redistribution conditional on performance. Moreover, we unpack performance in an effort and an ability component. Using the strategy method, we explore a full range of effort and redistribution levels. Finally, our task is unaffected by learning. In earlier papers, (Frohlich, Oppenheimer et al. 1987; Frohlich, Oppenheimer et al. 1987) had shown that the redistribution principle they use in this experiment is the most preferred (also see Herne and Suojanen 2004) . (Cabrales, Nagel et al. 2012) had participants interact for 50 announced rounds in fixed groups of 9. In the first stage of each period, each participant independently decided whether to receive a fixed income, or to buy a lottery with an expected value above the fixed income, but the risk of ending up with a lower payoff. In the second stage, knowing the realizations of the lotteries, and using different voting schemes, participants decided whether to redistribute all period income equally. The authors find that participants are more likely to vote in favor of redistribution if they have low income. In the final rounds, no group combines a willingness to buy lotteries with a high degree of redistribution. Our experiment most importantly differs in two respects: We implement a real effort task, and we exogenously impose (in one stage) effort and (in the next stage) a redistribution scheme. Almost all low and most medium earners vote for this scheme, as does a third of the high earners (further, less closely related experiments are reported by Tausch, Potters et al. 2010) .
Several papers have shown that differences in effort are seen as a justification for income differences, whereas differences in (innate) ability are not (Schokkaert and Overlaet 1989; Schokkaert and Capeau 1991; Konow 2000 for a redistribution scheme in favor of the group of which the subjects happen to be a member, an issue that we bracket. 
Effort and Preferences for Redistribution: Theoretical Motivation
To motivate our empirical analysis on the determinants of preferences for redistribution and effort, we draw on a simple model of effort choice and preferences for redistribution by (Persson, Tabellini et al. 2000: chapter 6) . Each individual i maximizes a utility function which depends on consumption and leisure: 
Hence, consumption cannot exceed the sum of labor income. The income an individual earns when being employed is given by labor income i l minus taxes where τ is the marginal tax rate. Without loss of generalization, wages are equalized to one.
The household's time constraint is given by
where i e denotes individual labor productivity, i.e., an individual's "innate ability", which is distributed according to ( ) ⋅ F , with mean e and median e e m < . This constraint gives l i the additional interpretation of working hours.
Households make two simultaneous decisions. First, they decide on their optimal labor supply, while taking the probability of becoming unemployed and the economy-wide marginal tax rate as given. Second, individuals decide which marginal tax rate is optimal for them, given their preferences and labor supply (effort) decision.
Optimal labor supply decision is given by the following first order condition:
The marginal benefit from additional labor supply in terms of higher (net) wages must be equal to the marginal cost in terms of less leisure time. Solving for optimal labor supply gives:
. Equation (4') leads to 
. Hence the government's budget needs to meet the following condition:
Individual i's tax preference can then be derived by substituting the government budget constraint and the optimal labor supply decision of the household into the utility function to obtain total indirect utility as a function of the tax rate:
Optimizing (1') with respect to the optimal tax rate for individual i yields:
where average labor supply decreases the higher the tax burden:
. This equation implicitly defines the optimal tax rate, and we obtain 
Disentangling this mutual interdependence of redistribution and effort empirically is not a trivial task. Ability that determines both cannot easily be observed by the researcher, and it is difficult to find instruments that affect effort and not redistribution preferences -or vice versa. Our empirical strategy proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we use the World Value Survey to analyze the interdependence of effort choices ( i l ) and redistribution preferences ( i τ ) in the field by estimating the determinants of effort and redistribution preferences using a system of equations. The system estimator explicitly allows modeling the effect of effort on redistribution preferences, and of redistribution preferences on the willingness to exert effort.
The advantage of the field data is that they provide information for a large number of countries and years, hence allowing the measuring of preferences across countries and time.
In the field, though, individual ability ( i e ) and average ability (e) can at best be captured indirectly. Also, our field data is a repeated cross-section. Consequently, we cannot account for unobserved individual specific heterogeneity. We therefore complement the field evidence by an experiment. In the experiment, we first hold redistribution schemes and thus (τ) constant and elicit effort choices ( i l ). From the same participants, we then elicit redistribution preferences ( i τ ), while we exogenously impose a level of effort. For both tests, between subjects we induce different ability levels (e).
Redistribution versus Effort: Field Evidence
The dependent variables in our empirical model using field data are preferences for redistribution and effort. We obtain information on these variables from the World Value Survey (WVS), which has been used frequently to test preferences for redistribution (see, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2009). It also contains information about respondents' preferences towards work and leisure. It is a repeated cross-sectional survey of values and attitudes which was conducted in a large number of countries in five waves over a time span of more than 25 years . We restrict our analysis to OECD countries in order to work with a sufficiently homogenous country sample, while providing heterogeneity with regard to institutional structures. Given the structure of the data, we cannot exploit individual-level dynamics, and we cannot include individual-specific fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. But we can analyze preferences for redistribution and effort for a large number of individuals in many countries and years.
Our measure for effort ( ) uses the answer to the question whether an individual considers it important to show initiative at work. Redistribution preferences ( ) are measured using answers to the question whether incomes should be made more equal.
3 Both variables are scaled such that a higher value indicates stronger preferences towards effort and redistribution, respectively. Details on the data definitions are given in the Appendix.
Descriptive statistics shown in Graph 1 show that preferences for effort and redistribution are not constant over time. According to the World Value Survey, the average proportion of respondents mentioning that it is important to show initiative at work ("effort") increased from 44% to 55% over the four waves along which the survey was conducted (1981-84 versus 1999-2004) . At the same time, support for greater income equality strengthened. Across all countries, this would suggest a positive correlation between effort and redistribution preferences.
Following previous work by (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Alesina and Giuliano 2009), we control for the following observed individual-specific characteristics ( ): age and age squared, gender, marital status (omitted category: "single or never married"), employment status (omitted category: "other"), income group (omitted category: "high income"), and church membership. Inter alia, these variables capture individual employment records and the probability of becoming unemployed or of being out of work.
The theoretical model has largely abstracted from the impact of the macroeconomic environment. Yet, in reality, macroeconomic conditions have an impact on the preferences for protection through the social security system and the incentives to work. We use information on top marginal income tax rates as a general measure of the degree of redistribution via the tax system. We use GDP growth as a proxy. High GDP growth can be taken as a proxy for the fact that effort pays. We therefore expect this variable to have a positive effect on effort preferences, and a negative effect on redistribution preferences.
Empirical Model
Our measure for initiative at work is a dummy, while the preference for redistribution is measured on a scale from 0 to 10. For the binary variable, we use a probit model, for the (quasi) continuous variable, we use an OLS model, but we have checked the robustness of our findings using an ordered probit model. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions.
Instrumentation Strategy
Identifying the impact of effort preferences on preferences for redistribution (and vice versa), while accounting for the potential endogeneity of the regressors, requires finding appropriate instruments. We use the following variables: For effort, we expect a dummy for the respondent being protestant to have a positive impact. This would be in line with the work by (Becker and Wössmann 2009) who show that, historically, protestantism was associated with higher economic prosperity and with better education. Also, we expect a relation between willingness to exert effort and the individual's perception of and attitude towards earning a living in the economy. In an environment where people may safely assume that there is a strong positive correlation between higher effort and higher income, they should be more likely to engage in effort. We proxy this expectation by the stated willingness to "trust". On the normative side, people should be more inclined to exert high effort if they believe that a high income should reflect higher effort. The willingness to engage in high effort and the statement that it is justifiable to accept a bribe (as one source of income unrelated to effort) should therefore be negatively correlated
As regards preferences for redistribution, we have three main variables which are expected to affect only this variable, but not effort choices. The first is measured at the individual level, and it describes the characteristics of the neighborhood. Due to the fixed costs of moving, these characteristics can be considered exogenous for the individual in the short to medium run. When asked about the characteristics of their neighborhood, respondents can answer whether neighbors have a different race or a different religion, whether they are drug addicts, alcoholics, whether they belong to a militant minority, or whether they have a criminal record.
We create a new variable which equals one if one of these conditions is fulfilled. The intuition behind this variable is that a more homogenous and less adverse neighborhood increases the probability that people favor redistribution. We expect a negative impact. The second variable that should affect preferences for redistribution (but not effort) measures the tightness of employment protection legislation. It is an index running from 1 to 5, and a higher value indicates stricter employment protection legislation. Redistribution preferences are influenced by living in a context where redistribution is more generous. We would thus expect to find a positive link between individual preferences for income equality and employment protection legislation. Finally, high growth volatility indicates that macroeconomic risks are high. We therefore expect this variable to have a positive effect on redistribution preferences. Table 1 shows the results for single equation models using the willingness to show initiative at work and preferences for a more equal allocation of income as the dependent variables. We report the results of instrumental variable regressions and thus additionally show the firststage regression results. The signs for the instruments are in line with expectations: People who trust more and who are protestant are more likely to answer that it is important to show initiative at work; people who find it acceptable to take bribes and who value leisure more do 11 less so. Preferences for greater income equality are negatively correlated with adverse conditions in the neighborhood and positively correlated with employment protection legislation and growth volatility.
Regression Results
Theory suggests that preferences for redistribution and effort are negatively correlated at the individual level. Our results confirm this prior, but they also show that this is no two-way correlation (Table 1) : The (instrumented) preference for redistribution has a negative impact on effort, and this effect becomes stronger when moving from (unreported) probit regressions to IV estimates. But the (instrumented) effort measure -which is negative and significant in a simple OLS model -does not have an impact on preferences for redistribution. This would be in line with the finding that (negative) causality is running from redistribution preferences to effort, but not vice versa.
In terms of the explanatory power, our empirical model explains about 5% of the individual effort and about 8% of the redistribution preferences, which is similar to other work in the field. In (Alesina and Giuliano 2009), for instance, the R² in models for redistribution preferences ranges from 0.09-0.15. The model is in line with our theoretical priors in the sense that respondents with medium or low incomes are less likely to answer that it is important to show initiative at work, and are more in favor of redistribution. Also, the finding that those who are self-employed are consistently less in favor of redistribution than non-selfemployed persons is in line with expectations, given that the self-employed can be expected to be more risk-taking and engage in higher effort. 5 Also, higher growth -which can be taken as a signal that effort pays off -has a positive impact on preferences for redistribution and lowers effort. Finally, preferences for redistribution and the top marginal tax rate at the country level are positively correlated, as expected.
We have run a couple of tests checking the robustness of our results with regard to the specific choice of the IV model. For the model reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 , the qualitative results are robust with regard to estimating the model using 2SLS or GMM and with regard to different options for clustering the errors. The Durbin-Hausman-Wu test of endogeneity rejects that "effort" is endogenous, but this result is somewhat sensitive to the specific choice of instruments. The Hansen Test is insignificant, which implies that the overidentification restriction is valid. However, when additionally including the instruments 12 which we conjecture to be important for "equality", these are significant as well: employment protection legislation has a negative and significant impact on effort; the heterogeneity of the neighborhood has a positive impact. Adding these variables causes the Hansen Test to become significant, though, implying that in this specification the overidentification restriction is not valid. Although we should not trust this specification too much, this already shows the problem to find instruments affecting one variable only.
The ivprobit command provides less flexibility with regard to testing the quality of the instruments. The first main difference to the equality equation is that effort has a negative and significant impact in the regular probit model and in different versions of the IV models.
Moving from OLS to an IV estimator, the estimated coefficient increases and the standard error decreases, suggesting that the OLS estimator is indeed biased. Moreover, the correlation coefficient measuring whether the error terms of the first and the second stage regression are correlated is highly significant, indicating that equality is endogenous. Hence, our model
suggests that equality has a negative impact on effort, but it is difficult to find instruments which affect one, but not the other.
Simultaneous Equation Model
So far, we have included preferences for redistribution in the equation for effort preferences, and vice versa, but we have not taken into account that the two might be jointly determined at the individual level. Solving the problem that standard estimates of simultaneous equation models are biased and inconsistent would be straightforward if we were to deal with two continuous variables. Such systems can be consistently and efficiently estimated using threestage least squares methods (Zellner and Theil 1962) . However, because one of our main dependent variables (the importance of showing initiative in a job) is a dichotomous variable, we need a system estimator which takes this into account.
We employ an instrumental variables estimation using the procedure suggested by (Maddala 1983; Keshk 2003) for systems where one of the endogenous variables is dichotomous. Using a two-stage procedure, we create instruments for the endogenous variables, and we substitute them for the endogenous counterparts in the structural equations of interest.
Let preferences for redistribution otherwise. 6 We estimate a two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) model. In the first step, the following reduced-form equations are estimated: Table 2 shows the results for the first stage regressions, focusing on the variables used as instruments in Table 1 . The remaining regressors are included in the model, but are not shown to save space. Qualitatively, the results are the same as before, but they show the problem pointed out earlier: while there are a couple of variables affecting effort, but not preferences, for redistribution, the reverse does not hold.
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Step two involves estimating the structural equations of interest: X are the exogenous explanatory variables affecting effort and redistribution preferences, respectively. Equation (8a) is estimated using OLS, and equation In terms of the feedback between effort and redistribution, Table 2 confirms the main conclusion from Table 1 : equality has a negative and significant impact on effort, but not vice versa. It is also interesting to note that, while moving from a single-equation OLS (or probit) to an IV model had virtually no impact on the estimates for the remaining control variables, this is not the case when moving to a system estimation. Most importantly, the impact of the income level and self-employment status on initiative becomes insignificant when modeling effort and redistribution jointly.
In sum, from our analysis of field data we can draw the following conclusions:
o Hypothesis 1 states that effort increases in individual ability and decreases in the tax rate. One proxy for individual ability is the actual income level. In the single-equation 14 model, we indeed find a positive correlation between income and the willingness to engage in effort. Yet, once we simultaneously model effort and redistribution preferences, low-and middle-income respondents do not think any less than more affluent respondents that effort at work pays off for them. In this sense, Hypothesis 1
is not confirmed by the data, and we also find no significant impact of the marginal tax rate.
o Hypothesis 2 states that individuals with a low individual ability prefer higher tax rates. This hypothesis is supported by our finding that low-income, middle-income, and unemployed respondents are more likely to favor redistribution. In this sense, changes in the income distribution over time and differences in these distributions across countries can have implications for the level of redistribution.
o Hypothesis 3 states that effort and redistribution preferences are negatively correlated at the individual level. Redistribution preferences indeed have a negative impact on the willingness to show effort at work, but not vice versa. One implication of this finding is that increased incentives to engage in effort must not necessarily come at the expense of less redistribution.
o Finally, the macroeconomic environment affects preferences: Higher macroeconomic volatility and higher growth tend to strengthen preferences for redistribution.
Redistribution versus Effort: Experimental Evidence
The field data have allowed estimating the relationship between effort (l i ) and tax/redistribution preferences (τ i ) in a world where ability (e i ) is heterogeneous. Yet, our ability to isolate the feedback between the two variables which are endogenously chosen by each individual hinges on the quality of the instruments. Also, individual real-world choices might differ from answers given in an interview. Therefore, we complement our analysis with experimental evidence.
Design
In the lab, we cannot standardize or induce those determinants of ability that a participant has acquired at birth or during her education. But we can measure this ability and control for it.
And we can induce differences in the ability to solve specific tasks. Moreover, we can make sure that participants act in groups, the heterogeneity of which we control. The general set up of our joint effort-and-redistribution experiment is given in Tables 3a-3c. The task is fully computerized. Participants earn a fixed piece rate for each problem they solve correctly.
To measure ability (e i ) and to induce effort (l i ), we use a task developed by (Mazar, Amir et al. 2008) . In tables of different size, participants are asked to find the one pair of numbers that add up to 10, as in Table 3a . The experiment then proceeds in three steps, eliciting effort and redistribution choices by inducing the respective other parameter.
In the first phase of the experiment, we measure individual ability (e i ) by asking participants to fill in Table 3a . Participants have announced 10 minutes to solve as many problems as they can. Problems are presented in the sequence of easy (2x2 tables), ordinary (3x3 tables), and difficult (4x4 tables) problems. The first phase gives us an individual-specific measure of ability, i.e., the number of problems a participant has solved correctly. Moreover, it gives participants a chance to familiarize themselves with the task so that they can make meaningful choices in the later parts of the experiment.
In the second phase, we elicit redistribution preferences by asking participants to fill in Table 3b . We randomly compose groups of four. Participants know that each group has one member from each of the ability quartiles. They are reminded of their own performance in the first phase. They further learn to which of the four ability classes they belong, and they are informed about the average performance of all four members of their group in the first phase.
The second phase measures redistribution preferences. Specifically, using the strategy method (Selten 1967) , we ask participants to decide for each level of effort and for each difficulty of the task how much redistribution they desire. Participants know they will have to exert the assigned effort at the end of the experiment if they do not want to lose their entire income.
Redistribution is financed from the proceeds of a tax that is proportional to income. Effort is fixed in percent of the number of problems this participant has correctly solved in the first phase in the range [30%, 120%], in steps of 10%. We have chosen these parameters to have sufficient variance in our explanatory variable and to reflect a macro-environment that makes earning the same amount of money as before easier (think of growth effects) or more difficult (think of technical progress making it more difficult to earn money in some professions). The tax rate and thereby the size of the lump-sum transfer is determined by the median of the statements by the four group members. Through randomly determining the difficulty of the task, we induce a handicap (e). Within the framework of the theoretical model, the random choice of table size has the interpretation of an exogenous shock that shifts mean ability e
upwards (if size is 2x2) or downwards (if size is 4x4).
In the third phase, we elicit effort preferences by asking participants to fill in Table 3c . Using the same task and the same procedure, we fix a tax rate. Again, each group member receives a quarter of total tax revenue, irrespective of her own effort and income. We now vary tax rates in the range [0%, 45%], in steps of 5%, where the upper limit is intended to reflect marginal tax rates observed in the real world. We now ask participants to commit to a number of problems they are prepared to solve (correctly) for each tax rate and difficulty of the task (with the maximum fixed at 50 problems). Feedback from redistribution choices is withheld until all participants have also taken effort choices, which is why the order in which participants have taken these decisions cannot play a role.
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Note that our design directly matches the theoretical model. The number of problems a participant solves in the first part of the experiment informs us about ability acquired by birth and education. This allows us to measure e i . By taking the average, for each randomly composed group of 4, we can calculate e. In the second part of the experiment, we exogenously impose effort l i . Because participants are free to leave the lab once they have completed their tasks, we also manipulate time for leisure x i . All proceeds from the voted redistribution scheme are distributed equally among the members of the group, which is how we implement government's budget constraint f. In the third part of the experiment, we manipulate the tax rate τ. 
Descriptive Statistics
As expected, participants' ability was quite heterogeneous. In the first part, during 10 minutes they solved between 5 and 44 problems (mean: 23.02, median 22 Survey, but now uses incentivized choices, rather than mere answers to survey questions. As one sees, very high redistribution preferences (choices) are associated with low effort preferences, and vice versa. Ability (graphically displayed by membership in one of the four ability classes) has a strong effect on effort preferences, but is not systematically associated with redistribution preferences.
While this is interesting in its own right, in the following we focus on the effect of exogenously manipulated effort which participants knew they would have to actually exert at the end of the experiment. This gives us both a cleaner and a more fine-grained measure of effort as a determinant of redistribution preferences.
Regression Results
We revert to regression analysis because this gives us the possibility to control for competing explanations. From each participant, we have 30 effort choices, for 10 different levels of imposed effort, and for three different handicaps. We therefore have panel data. Moreover, when they make effort choices, participants are aware of the mean ability of their group, they know to which ability class they belong, that one participant from each quartile of the distribution is in their group, and that redistribution will take place within their specific group.
For all these reasons, choices of individuals are nested within groups.
We match the data-generating process by a mixed effects model, with a separate error term shock, in the following we report only the latter. Table 4 shows the determinants of effort choices. We find a significant effect of ability throughout, in the expected direction. The more problems a participant has solved in the first phase, the more problems she is also willing to solve in the third phase, despite the fact that this may involve redistribution. This willingness is not conditional on the mean effort level in the group (model 2). Participants want to solve more problems if tasks are easy and less problems if tasks are difficult (model 4). Even conditional on all these explanatory variables, the higher the imposed degree of redistribution, the lower the willingness to exert effort (model 5). We thus fully support H 1 . The dampening effect of redistribution on effort, however, is not dramatic. The maximum redistribution rate is 0.45. Even for that rate, the statistical model only predicts a reduction of effort from about 23 to 18 problems, i.e., a reduction by 21% (model 5). Finally, effort preferences react to the opportunity cost in terms of additional time spent in the lab, in the expected direction (model 6).
Explaining Effort Choices

Explaining Redistribution Choices
When analyzing redistribution choices, as is done in Table 5 , we get a somewhat different picture. 9 We find a significantly weaker preference for redistribution if earning money is easy, and a significantly stronger preference for redistribution if earning money is difficult (model 4). Recall that effort is imposed as a percentage of the problems this participant has correctly solved in phase 1. This variable has a significant positive effect (model 5). If everybody has to exert higher effort, the willingness to redistribute increases. The prospect of more time for leisure does not explain redistribution choices (model 6). Recall that, in the World Value Survey, we had not found a significant effect of effort preferences on redistribution preferences. Here we find an effect of imposed effort, but it is not negative (as in the theoretical model), but positive. The two significant effects both suggest: if the community is in dire circumstances, all stand together and help each other; if all can easily fend for themselves, all see much less urge for ex post corrections of income through redistribution. This stands in clear contradiction to H 3 .
We, finally, consider the effect of ability on redistribution preferences. In none of the linear mixed effects models (models 1-6) do we find a significant effect. This only changes with a different choice of functional form. In model 7, we estimate a random effects Tobit model, with censoring from below. 10 We now find the significant negative effect predicted by the theoretical model: the more a participant outperformed the remaining members of her group in the first phase, the less she is in favor of redistribution, and vice versa. The Tobit model assumes that some of those participants who have voted for zero redistribution actually would have preferred a negative redistribution rate. This is intuitive. Such participants care about relative payoffs, and would want society to pay a premium to high performers. With this qualification, we support H 2 .
9 Again, coefficients and p-values look very similar if we only consider choices for the 3x3 problems. Because we did not allow participants to choose more than 50 problems, we also re-estimated all models as random effects Tobit models, with upper censoring. Here, too, coefficients and significance levels are very similar. All these additional estimates are available from the authors upon request.
Concluding Remarks
The global economic and financial crisis that started in 2007 and only recently culminated in the deep crisis of the Euro system will have a significant impact on the economic landscape and future policy discussions. On the one hand, the crisis has shown the fragility of existing insurance systems, as private investors have suffered substantial losses. The ability of governments to shield their electorates from the perils of international markets has been called into question. Many workers have experienced increased labor market risks, and they demand greater protection by their government. On the other hand, governments will have little room for maneuver as public households have to deal with the increasing burden of public debt.
Hence, a key question will be how policies can be implemented that do not threaten future economic growth.
An improved understanding of the link between redistribution and effort, and their relationship with ability, has been the purpose of this paper. Our empirical work has been motivated by a theoretical model which posits that policies which increase redistribution have negative implications for effort, and that those exerting high effort are in favor of little redistribution. The model predicts those who have high ability to exert more effort and to be opposed to (more) redistribution. We have tested the implications of this model using field and experimental data, and our research has three main findings.
First, both, in the field and in the lab, we support the predicted negative effect of redistribution on effort. The more income is redistributed, i.e., the higher the tax rate and the higher the redistribution rate financed from this tax are, the more the willingness to exert effort declines.
Second, in the field, we also find clear support for the negative relationship between ability and redistribution preferences predicted by the model. The more money a person is able to earn, the less she favors redistribution. Surprisingly, when we elicit actual redistribution choices in the lab, we find the same relationship only if we use a statistical model that allows for the possibility of society even paying a premium for high performance.
Third, more importantly even, both in the field and in the lab, we qualify the link between redistribution and effort preferences expected by the theoretical model. If we simultaneously estimate the effect of effort preferences on redistribution preferences, and vice versa, using
proper instruments, we still find the negative effect of redistribution on effort, but we no longer find a negative effect of effort on redistribution. In the lab, we find a significant effect, but it even is positive. If the design of the experiment forces (all) participants to exert high effort, all are in favor of more redistribution. The effect is even more pronounced if an exogenous shock makes earning money more difficult for everybody. This suggests that the theoretical model misses a "solidarity" motive. Experimental participants apparently do see redistribution less as an opportunity for equalizing income, and more as a technology for giving everybody a "fair" minimum income if the economy is in dire circumstances.
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Of course, strictly speaking, the results of our empirical exercises cannot easily be transferred outside the boundaries of our field and experimental set-ups. Drawing policy lessons from the field data is subject to the Lucas critique, and experiments never capture all effects that might matter in reality. Still, we believe that our results could be potentially relevant for the current policy debate in the following sense: In the past five years since the outbreak of the world financial crisis, a series of severe shocks has hit the world economy. The labor market responses to this shock will depend on preferences for redistribution. Our data suggests that even many of those with high earning ability, and of those who currently exert high effort, would be in support of helping those who have been hit by the crisis. Yet, if the degree of protection increases, this risks having a negative feedback effect on effort and growth.
Through this channel, in the long run, redistribution may even be bad for growth and fairness.
For the higher the redistributive burden, the smaller the fraction of income an individual may influence by working harder. If income is at least partly determined by luck, the portion of income inequality resulting from luck becomes the more important the less effort matters (Alesina and Giuliano 2009). The resulting distribution of incomes would be considered less "fair". Both our field and our lab evidence point to an additional, more direct channel. If there is more redistribution, the willingness to exert effort decreases. The degree of redistribution directly and negatively affects effort preferences. This poses a hard choice for policy makers.
When the decision in favor of more redistribution has to be taken, there is at least no opposition, if not positive support even by those with a high contemporaneous preference for
effort. Yet, later the economy will suffer from the fact that the higher burden of redistribution dampens the willingness to exert more effort. In this sense, policy preferences can be considered short-sighted. The electorate seems to suffer from inconsistency in its preferences for redistribution.
Data Appendix
World Value Survey
OECD countries only. Variables "v" refer to most recent waves.
Proxy for Effort
"Importance to show initiative" (c016)
Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job? "An opportunity to use initiative" 0 'Not mentioned', 1 'Mentioned '
Preferences for Redistribution
"Incomes should be made more equal" (e035, v116)
= incomes should be made more equal, …, 10 = we need larger income differences
Re-scaled such that 10 = incomes should be made more equal, …, 1 = we need larger income differences Years: 1989 Years: , 1990 Years: , 1991 Years: , 1995 Years: , 1996 Years: , 1997 Years: , 1998 Years: , 1999 Years: , 2000 Years: , 2001 Years: , 2002 Years: , 2005 Years: , 2006 Years: , 2007 Years: , 2008 Further individual-specific variables:
o Age and age squared (x003, v237) o Church membership (a065, a098, v24) o Employment status (x028, v241) (omitted category: "other") 
Graph 1: Preferences for Redistribution and Effort
This table shows the mean responses to the questions "Importance to show initiative" (0/1) and "Incomes should be made more equal" (10-1) of the World Value Survey. The four waves capture the years 1981-84, 1989-93, 1994-99, and1999-2004 . Not all questions have been asked in all countries in each wave. Table 1 shows the determinants of effort and redistribution preferences based on data from five waves of the World Value Survey using data for OECD countries. Second stage models are estimated using maximum likelihood. A full set of year and country fixed effects is included. Column (1) shows the 1 st stage regression for an instrumental variables regression (ivregress) using the variable "Incomes should be made more equal (Scale 1-10)" as the dependent variable. Instruments for "effort" are trust, protestant, leisure important, and accepting a bribe. Column (2) has the corresponding 2 nd stage regressions. Column (3) shows the 1 st stage regressions for an instrumentation variables (ivprobit) regression using the variable "Important to show initiative at work (0/1)" as the dependent variable. Instruments for "equality" are employment protection legislation, neighbors are different and growth volatility. Column (4) has the corresponding second stage regression. The omitted categories for employment status is the category "other", for family status "single or never married", and for income "high income". The constant term is not reported. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Maddala (1983) and implemented by Keshk (2003) . The variables "Important to use initiative" and "Incomes should be made more equal" are the predicted values from the first stage regressions described in the main body of the text. The omitted categories for employment status is the category "other", for family status "single or never married", and for income "high income". Estimates in columns (3) and (4) 
